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Abstract 
Based  on  Whitley’s  “National  Business  Systems”  (NBS)  institutional  framework  (Whitley  1997; 
1999), we theorize about and empirically investigate the impact of nation-level institutions on firms’ 
corporate social performance (CSP). Using a sample of firms from 42 countries spanning seven years, 
we  construct  an  annual  composite  CSP  index  for  each  firm  based  on  social  and  environmental 
metrics.  We find that the political system, followed by the labor and education system, and the 
cultural system are the most important NBS categories of institutions that impact CSP. Interestingly, 
the financial system appears to have a relatively less significant impact. We discuss implications for 
research, practice and policy-making. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  In recent years, growing attention has been paid on corporations’ social responsibilities, 
termed as “corporate social responsibility” (CSR), both in the academic literature (e.g. McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2001; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003) as well as in the business 
world. For example, in the  2010 UN Global Compact – Accenture CEO study  ninety-three percent 
(93%) of the 766 participant CEOs worldwide declared sustainability as an “important” or “very 
important” factor for their organizations’ future success. Moreover, eighty-one percent (81%) stated 
that sustainability issues are now fully embedded in the strategy and operations of their organization.  
The emphasis that firms have placed on their CSR activities has in many respects, fundamentally 
shifted the way we think about and understand the relationships between firms, the institutional 
environment in which they operate, and their various stakeholders, including local communities, 
employees, suppliers, governments and civil society.  
Nowadays, business organizations adopt and implement a range of CSR activities, while a 
number of independent agencies, such as Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini (KLD), Bloomberg, and 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4 rate and rank order corporations based on their corporate social 
performance (CSP). Here, we follow Wood (1991) in defining CSP as “a business organization’s 
configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and policies, 
programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm’s societal relationships" (Wood, 
1991:693). In other words, CSP constitutes the social performance outcome of a firm’s undertaking of 
CSR activities. Recently, studies have found that independent company rating and ranking schemes 
(e.g. Consumer Reports, Moody’s) can significantly influence the behavior of consumers (Sen & 
Bhattacharya, 2001), sell-side analysts (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2010) and investors (Becchetti, Ciciretti 
& Hasan, 2009; Rock, 2003) as well as the organizations that are being rated (Elsbach & Kramer, 
1996; Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Chatterji & Toffel, 2010). Yet what such CSP ratings and rankings 
have also revealed is a significant variation in CSP not only across firms and industries but also across 
countries.  3 
 
Institutional theory has long established that organizations are embedded within broader 
social structures, comprising of different types of institutions which exert significant influence on the 
corporations’ decision making (e.g. Campbell, 2007; Campbell, Hollingsworth & Lindberg, 1991). 
Moreover, recent work in CSR has argued that CSR activities are framed vis-à-vis the social context 
and are thus influenced by the prevailing institutions in such contexts (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010).  
In this paper, we build on both these literatures and argue that cross-sectional variation in CSP that 
results from the undertaking of CSR activities can be attributed to variation across nation-level 
institutions. Our focus on nation-level institutions is based on prior work within the varieties of 
capitalism theory (Hall & Soskice, 2001) which showed that nation level institutional heterogeneity 
can lead to comparative institutional advantages for those firms that operate within different countries 
(Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010). 
To date however, only a limited number of studies have theoretically characterized  the 
mechanisms through which variation in nation-level institutions and business systems may impact the 
variation in CSP across corporations (Jones, 1999; Stanwick & Stanwick, 1998; Jackson & 
Apostolakou, 2010) or have empirically documented their role across a broad set of countries (e.g. 
Habisch et al., 2004; Jamali et al., 2009; Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010). This has been primarily due 
to the lack of comparable CSP data across such a large number of countries. Accordingly, many 
scholars have argued that we are still far from being able to explain social performance heterogeneity 
across firms and have called for a comprehensive theoretical and empirical investigation into the 
reasons behind the observed variation; variation that may be due to the differences in nation-level 
institutions or national business systems (Whitely, 1997; Maignan & Ralston, 2002; Margolis & 
Walsh, 2003; Campbell, 2007).  In this paper we answer this call and we explore whether and to what 
extent variation in CSP across firms may be explained by variation in nation-level institutions (Jones, 
1999; Campbell, 2007; Matten & Moon, 2008); whereby we conceptualize such institutions as distinct 
“national business systems” (NBS), following the classification system proposed in Whitley (1997; 
1999). We therefore focus on the following key question: What are the mechanisms through which 
nation-level institutions within national business systems affect variation in corporate social 
performance? 4 
 
  In answering this question, we structure the rest of the paper as follows. In the next section we 
briefly review prior literature that has investigated the relation between institutions and CSP and we 
highlight those insights that relate to our own research question. We then draw on institutional theory 
to outline theoretical mechanisms linking nation-level institutions, and NBS in particular, with 
variation in CSP. In the section that follows, we describe the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 dataset, the 
main data source used for constructing our final sample, and we provide details on the empirical 
estimation strategy that we use to test our hypotheses. The next section presents our results, followed 
by a section that discusses the implications of our findings for scholars and practitioners. After 
presenting caveats and limitations of our study, we conclude and sketch avenues for future research. 
PRIOR LITERATURE 
  Although the literature has not yet reached a consensus definition of CSP, we  join an 
extensive stream of work (e.g. Wolfe and Aupperle, 1991; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Hillman and 
Keim, 2001; Waldman, Siegel and Javidan, 2006) in defining it as a composite multidimensional 
construct capturing “a business organization’s configuration of principles of social responsibility, 
processes of social responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to 
the firm’s social relationships” (Wood, 1991: p.693).  Given this definition, we were able to locate a 
limited number of prior studies that have focused on factors that affect cross-country variation in CSP 
(e.g. Jones, 1999; Campbell, 2007; Aguilera et al., 2007; Chapple & Moon, 2005; McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2001) which we briefly review here.  
  First, a number of papers study CSP comparatively across a small number of countries (e.g. 
Maignan & Ralson, 2002; Ramasamy & Ting, 2004; Welford, 2004). For example, Maignan and 
Ralston (2002) study the extent to which firms in France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States had publicly committed to socially responsible behavior through postings on their 
corporate websites. Using a sample of 100 firms in each country, they find systematic and significant 
differences in managerial incentives and stakeholder pressure on the firm to act in socially responsible 
ways across these four countries. In another study, Chapple and Moon (2005) analyze website 
reporting of CSR activities by 50 firms in seven Asian countries (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 5 
 
Philippines, South Korea, Singapore and Thailand) and find that cross-country CSP variation cannot 
be explained by the stage of the country’s economic development as they hypothesize; rather, they 
suggest that “national factors” could explain such variation although they do not formally investigate 
such factors. They also find that multinational corporations adjust their CSR activities according to 
the specific national contexts in which they operate.  
  Theoretically, Aguilera et al. (2007) argue that “because business organizations are embedded 
in different national systems, they will experience divergent degrees of internal and external pressures 
to engage in social responsibility initiatives” (p. 836). They compare and contrast the Anglo-
American model with the Continental European model and suggest that shareholders in the former 
would encourage CSR activities when they result in short-term benefits whereas in the latter model, 
shareholders would focus more on long-term strategies that generate benefits for a broader range of 
stakeholders. Their argument is effectively based on nation-level institutional differences between the 
two models (e.g. dispersed ownership focusing on short term returns within the Anglo-American 
model vs. long-term debt finance and ownership of large blockholders within the Continental model). 
  More recently, Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) empirically investigate the influence of the 
institutional environment on CSR activities of European firms and find that firms based in the more 
liberal market economies of the Anglo-Saxon countries achieve higher levels of CSP, compared to 
firms based in the more coordinated market economies (CMEs) of Continental Europe. They argue 
that these findings support the hypothesis that voluntary CSR activities in liberal economies act as a 
substitute for institutionalized forms of stakeholder participation whereas in CMEs CSP often takes on 
more implicit forms. In other words, the Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) study provides evidence of 
the influence of institutions on CSP across two broadly-defined NBS.  
  In a related study, Maignan (2001) investigates consumers’ understanding of CSP in France, 
Germany, and the US and finds that their perceptions are significantly influenced by nation-level 
institutions. In particular, she finds that in France and Germany consumers are more likely to support 
socially responsible corporations, paying less attention to their economic responsibilities, whereas the 
reverse order applies for consumers in the US. She argues that her findings are based on differences in 
“national ideologies” (Lodge, 1990): individualistic (US) vs. communitarian (France, Germany). Her 6 
 
study therefore suggests that nation-level institutions may affect the corporations’ undertaking of CSR 
activities and resulting CSP via their impact on consumer perceptions. 
  In addition to cross-country variation in CSP, other studies focus on particular CSP activities 
(e.g. corporate philanthropy) and explore the link between such activities and government regulation. 
For example, one debate that has not yet been resolved in the literature is whether the ability to deduct 
charitable contributions from taxable income – an aspect of tax regulation – impacts in any way the 
total amount of corporate philanthropy that corporations are willing to provide (Campbell, 2007). Put 
differently, tax regulation – a property rights institution – can directly affect a frequently encountered 
component of the corporations’ CSP activities (Campbell, 2007; Campbell, 2004: 131-132). Evidently 
then, these studies indirectly suggest that national institutions (in this case, the political and legal 
systems) may impact CSP in the form of corporate giving across organizations. 
  Recently, work in the field of international business (IB) has focused on the differences 
stemming from the variety of institutional contexts. More specifically attention has been paid to the 
role of global institutions (e.g. global standards) - such as the United Nation’s Global Compact or the 
ISO standards - in exerting a harmonizing effect; particularly so for multinational enterprises (MNEs). 
For example, Christmann and Taylor (2006) explore this potentially harmonizing effect by focusing 
on ISO-certified firms in China. They find that such international certifiable management standards 
are effective only if certified firms strategically choose to substantially (rather than symbolically) 
comply with the requirements of the standards. Moreover, Crilly (2011) finds that in emerging 
markets, subsidiaries of large MNEs face substantial pressure for social engagement due to global 
pressures for legitimacy, which are stronger than isomorphic pressures from local norms and 
standards.  
  A related and extensive stream of literature, rather than focusing on CSP as the dependent 
variable, explores the impact of institutions on the adoption of codes of conduct or the adoption of 
voluntary reporting practices related to CSR. Without attempting a comprehensive review of this 
literature here, we indicatively note that  Langlois & Schlegelmilch (1990) document the existence of 
a distinctly European (as opposed to American) approach to codifying ethics, van Tulder and Kolk 
(2001) provide evidence for the effect of institutions on the adoption of ethics codes in the sporting 7 
 
industry and more recently, Haxhi & van Ees (2010) argue that particular dimensions of national 
culture affect the cross-national diversity in the worldwide diffusion of corporate governance best 
practices. Relatedly, with regards to voluntary reporting, Meek et al. (1995) find that the disclosure of 
strategic, financial as well as non-financial information reflects distinct national and regional 
influences across the U.S., the U.K. and Continental Europe. Furthermore, Smith et al. (2005) argue 
that the extent and quality of corporate social disclosure in annual reports is contingent on the distinct 
manner in which the role of a corporation and its stakeholders is defined within different societies. 
Given the importance of reporting practices in the data collection process of the ranking agencies, 
these studies as well as numerous others highlight the plurality of ways through which cross-national 
variation in institutions may affect CSR practices and by extension, CSP. 
  In summary, prior work has directly or indirectly explored how institutional variation may 
explain the differences in the adoption of specific CSR activities (e.g. ethics or governance codes) or 
differences in voluntary CSR reporting practices, typically across a limited number of national 
contexts. Therefore, the issue of how the diversity in cross-national institutional factors that 
contributes towards the variation in the entire CSP of companies has by and large remained 
unexplored. To fill this gap in our understanding, in the next section we provide a comprehensive 
theoretical model about how a country’s institutional environment, conceptualized as a NBS and 
comprised of the a) the political system, b) the financial system, c) the education and labor system and 
d) the cultural system (Whitley, 1999) may explain variation in CSP. 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Our focus is on understanding why firms that are embedded in different nation-level 
institutions, but operate in the same industry, have significantly different CSP. For example, Japanese 
automakers Daihatsu and Kawasaki have considerably lower CSP than German automakers Daimler 
and BMW. Below we will argue that differences in the political, labor and education, financial and 
cultural institutions of Japan and Germany are likely to generate these differences in CSP. In terms of 
political institutions, laws and regulations that promote product market competition are more 
prevalent in Japan, a characteristic that limits the ability of companies to invest in CSR activities and 
generate high CSP. At the same time, Japan is characterized by relatively higher levels of corruption 8 
 
further impeding the ability of companies to have high CSP. Regarding labor and educational 
institutions, Japan is characterized by a labor market where skilled capital is more readily available, 
and as a result supply of human capital is higher, decreasing the incentives of companies to use CSP 
as a recruitment differentiator. Moreover, employees are less likely to be organized in unions 
compared to Germany where union density is remarkably high providing unions with the power to 
force companies to improve their CSP. Although both countries have similar financial systems that 
are characterized by dominant banking groups, Germany was one of the first countries to have an SRI 
stock market index signaling investor pressure on companies to improve CSP. Finally, in Germany’s 
more individualistic society firms are more likely to undertake explicit CSR activities in response to 
perceived expectations by a wider range of stakeholders, compared to societies in which CSR assumes 
an implicit form and is established as an institutional substitute (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010). 
For our theoretical model, we follow Huntington (1969) who defines institutions as “stable, 
valued, recurring patterns of behavior,” defined by their adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and 
coherence (1969: 12).  More broadly, institutional theory focuses on the role of social beliefs, values, 
relations, constraints and expectations (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011) and argues that corporations are 
embedded in a nexus of formal and informal rules (North, 1990) which directly influence the 
activities they engage in and their subsequent outcomes. Accordingly, firms may develop strategic 
responses to institutions, with one possible response being the adoption and implementation of CSR 
initiatives (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010) that could involve pro-active attempts to fill institutional 
voids (Oliver, 1991). 
Importantly, subsequent work argues that institutions vary considerably across countries and 
they collectively constitute distinct “types” of national business systems (NBS) (Whitley, 1999) which 
are based on differing logics of economic activity (Whitley, 1999; Crouch, 2005; Deeg and Jackson, 
2007; Matten & Moon, 2008). Thus, NBS are defined as “distinctive patterns of economic 
organization that vary in their degree and mode of authoritative coordination of economic activities, 
and in the organization of, and interconnections between, owners, managers, experts, and other 
employees” (Whitley, 1999, p.33). Our choice of Whitley’s NBS framework as the foundation of our 
work is based on numerous empirical studies that have documented that a few key institutions are 9 
 
critical for corporate behavior due to their impact on the relationships between the firm and its 
primary stakeholders: the political, the financial and the labor institutions (see Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003 for a comprehensive review of these studies; Campbell, 2007). In this respect, Whitley’s NBS 
model fully encompasses these three types of institutions and additionally, it accounts for the key role 
of the cultural system. In particular, Whitley (1999) argues that different institutional arrangements 
provide differential access to critical firm resources such as labor and capital. Whereas the access to 
capital is directly affected by the financial system and indirectly by the political system, labor is 
affected both by the labor market and also “the norms governing trust and authority relations are 
crucial because they structure exchange relationships […] between employers and employees” (p.51). 
In fact, some scholars argue that CSR is a typical “social construction”: differences across 
NBS and national institutional environments generate differences in the roles of various stakeholders 
within them (Matten & Moon, 2008; Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010) and therefore, differences about 
how stakeholders’ needs, expectations and interests are conceptualized. Moreover, they argue that 
“institutionalized  rules  and  understandings  help  firms  to  frame,  communicate  and  monitor  these 
practices in socially accepted ways” (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010, p.387). Since institutions shape 
the social and political processes of how stakeholders’ interests are defined (Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003) specific CSR practices are more likely to be adopted and to become effective when they are 
embedded within particular institutional structures as opposed to others.  
In  general,  despite  years  of  research  on  the  antecedents  of  financial  performance 
heterogeneity (e.g. McGahan and Porter, 1997, 2002), we are still far from being able to explain 
social performance heterogeneity across firms. Provided that in societies around the world, different 
systems of markets have emerged which reflect the societies’ institutions, their ethics and values, and 
the range and types of social relations, we would a priori expect differences to arise in the ways firms 
socially perform across distinct societies (Matten and Moon, 2008 p.407). In fact, Whitley (2005) 
highlights different degrees of diversity in internal firm organization within NBS and argues that the 
character of the state not only determines the extent of institutional coherence but also affects the 
degree of homogeneity in firm behavior. In our work therefore we focus on the following question: 10 
 
What are the mechanisms through which nation-level institutions within national business systems 
affect variation in corporate social performance? 
  To answer this question, we follow Matten and Moon (2008) in arguing that CSP variation 
may partially be explained “by historically grown institutional frameworks that shape national 
business systems (NBS) (Whitley, 1997)” (p.407). We recognize of course, that variation in nation-
level institutions is not the only factor affecting CSP; firm- and industry-level determinants matter as 
well. In this paper however, our focus  is on the variance in the nation-level institutions while 
empirically controlling in our specifications for these other factors. Therefore,  our approach is 
consistent with Campbell (2007) who argues that “variation in socially responsible behavior is 
probably associated with variation in institutions and sticks and carrots they provide to constrain and 
enable such behavior” (p.952). We also acknowledge that by doing so we sacrifice some breadth in 
terms of investigating other factors that can explain CSP variation, but we believe we gain in terms of 
the theoretical depth of our argument regarding the role of nation-level institutions within the broader 
NBS. 
 Political system 
  According to Whitley (1999), an essential feature of any political system is the power of the 
state: “the extent to which states dominate the economy and share risks such that businesses become 
dependent on state policies and actions” (p.48). Given significant diversity across countries in the 
power of the state, it follows that the extent to which states “directly or indirectly regulate market 
boundaries, entry and exit, as well as set constraints on the activities of economic actors” (p.48) 
through laws and regulations is also an important determinant of organizational outcomes in general, 
and social performance in particular. For example, de Oliveira (2006) argues that in Latin America, a 
political system characterized by poor governance results in CSR activities by corporations that are a 
substitute for the lack of state policies. Similarly, Adi et al. (2006) argue that due to widespread 
government failings, political unrest and corruption,  Nigerian firms have focused on healthcare and 
education as the main areas of their CSR activities to compensate for the drawbacks of the Nigerian 
political system. 11 
 
   Broadly, laws and regulations play an important role in facilitating the corporation’s 
engagement with the state as well as its key stakeholders (Campbell, 2007; Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; 
Roe, 2003). More particularly, several laws and regulations around the world aim at promoting 
competition between firms whereby competition is usually modeled as taking place in the market for 
outputs (i.e. products and services).  Since they are typically based on the neo-classical economic 
view of the world, such laws and regulations are enacted because they arguably lead to higher levels 
of allocative efficiency, higher rates of innovation (Porter, 1985) and eventually, even to higher levels 
of social welfare. However, given high levels of competition, firms are faced with razor thin profit 
margins to the extent that their very survival may be put at risk. Therefore, social performance will be 
lower for two reasons: first, firms with minimal or zero profits have fewer, if any, resources to invest 
in activities that would increase CSP. Second, as Campbell (2007) notes, firms in highly competitive 
environments would be more likely to cut corners and attempt to save money whenever and however 
possible. It is no surprise then that indeed periods of very intense competition have been associated 
with lower levels of CSP taking the form of “compromised product quality and safety, sweating labor 
and cheating customers” (Kolko, 1963; McCraw, 1984; Schneiberg, 1999; Weinstein, 1968). 
Accordingly, we argue that in countries where laws and regulations promote high levels of 
competition, corporations are more likely to score low on the CSP index.  
Hypothesis 1: In countries where laws and regulations promote higher levels of competition, 
corporations will score lower on the CSP index. 
Moreover, countries around the world adopt legal rules and regulations to protect 
shareholders from corporate insiders investing in projects or activities that would benefit themselves 
or other stakeholders instead of the shareholders. For example, the undertaking of some CSR 
activities such as corporate philanthropic contributions may be primarily driven by managerial utility 
considerations (e.g. satisfaction of some personal or moral imperative of the manager) rather than the 
enhancement of shareholder wealth (e.g. Galaskiewicz, 1997; Clotfelter, 1985:190; Navarro, 1988). In 
addition, as prior literature has documented, social issue participation (e.g. not engaging with ‘sin’ 
industries, avoiding nuclear energy, etc) is negatively associated with shareholder value creation 
(Hillman & Keim, 2001). This finding is consistent with the neo-classical viewpoint (Friedman, 1970; 12 
 
Jensen, 2002) which states that shareholder value maximization is the corporation’s raison d’être. Any 
other initiatives, including CSR activities and social issue participation, that would address issues of 
stakeholders other than shareholders are essentially regarded as a waste of shareholder wealth. It 
follows then, that in countries where laws and regulations effectively protect shareholders’ interests, 
thus reinforcing the neo-classical shareholder primacy model, the incentives for company insiders to 
address the interests of any other stakeholder are significantly lowered; the undertaking of CSR 
activities could be perceived as rent-seeking behaviour. Accordingly, CSP suffers. 
Hypothesis 2: In countries where laws and regulations promote higher levels of shareholder 
protection, corporations will score lower on the CSP index. 
  In addition to these legal institutions, corporations often deal directly with states in a variety 
of ways (Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, and Eden, 2005) and for reasons that include bargaining for public 
sector contracts, lobbying activities, negotiations about acceptable practices and antitrust cases, and 
other instances. As a result, state efficiency and bureaucracy as well as the overarching system of 
values and beliefs of the governmental officials – and the ruling party or coalition in particular – 
affect the level of CSP that corporations achieve. 
  Specifically, we expect that firms in countries where values and beliefs dictate lower levels of 
corruption will achieve higher levels of CSP for three reasons. First, in environments of high 
corruption some firms are more likely to engage in unethical practices to reduce their costs (e.g. child 
labor) or to increase their market share (e.g. through bribery). Such behavior will push other 
companies to also engage in unethical practices to remain competitive. Second, the resulting benefits 
to ethical firms may be lower in more corrupt countries since in such countries the state is less likely 
to provide incentives for them to be socially responsible in the form of tax exemptions, financial 
support and improved infrastructure. Third, ethical corporations themselves may have an effect on 
corruption in itself: firms that embed CSR activities within their core strategy – especially the 
formulation and adoption of ethical codes and corporate policies relating to procurement and project 
acquisition – are more likely to actively resist and oppose unethical activities more broadly. As a 
result, they contribute towards a lower overall level of corruption in the country overall (Luo, 2006). 13 
 
Hypothesis 3: In countries with higher levels of corruption, corporations will score lower on 
the CSP index. 
Finally, we argue that the ideological system of values and beliefs of state officials and of 
ruling parties or coalitions will also be a key factor affecting CSP variation. In countries where the 
predominant political ideology is tilted towards the left, collective social consciousness is more likely 
to encourage firms to attach greater importance to CSR (Davis & Thompson, 1994; Riley, 1983). As 
Matten & Moon (2008) argue, when CSR is motivated by a “societal consensus on the legitimate 
expectations of the roles and contributions of all major groups in society, including corporations” then 
by definition, CSR assumes an implicit - as opposed to an explicit - form. Accordingly, implicit CSR 
is more likely to materialize under leftist regimes (e.g. more coordinated economies) rather than 
rightist ones. Since implicit CSR consists of values, norms, and rules that together generate codified 
and mandatory requirements for corporations that are not conventionally described explicitly as CSR, 
implicit CSR materializes as an institutional substitute (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010). In other 
words, in countries with a more leftist political ideology, CSR is more likely to be embedded within 
formal institutional structures rather than expressed through voluntary and explicit corporate 
initiatives. The stronger such institutional structures are, the more they crowd out explicit forms of 
CSR and the more they lessen the need for explicit CSR initiatives to be undertaken and 
communicated by corporations. To the extent that CSP measures the outcomes of such voluntary and 
explicit CSR initiatives as opposed to simply measuring compliance with formal laws and regulations, 
it will tend to be lower in leftist countries. 
Hypothesis 4: In countries with a more leftist political ideology, corporations will score lower 
on the CSP index. 
Education and Labor system 
In addition to the political system, Whitley (1999) also identifies the “system for developing 
and controlling skills” (p.50) that consists of two interrelated sets of institutions: “the system that 
develops and certifies competences and skills” (i.e. the education system) and “the institutions that 
control the terms on which the owners of those skills sell them in labor markets and how those 
markets are organized” (i.e. the labor system). A firm’s employees are  also a “primary” stakeholder 14 
 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Freeman, Harrison & Wicks, 2007) and therefore, changing strategic 
priorities, technologies and markets as well as the decisions relating to labor-management strategies 
are all contingent on the strength of trade unions, who can directly control the skills and capabilities in 
the economy (Whitley, 1999).   
Consequently, the power of labor unions is a key factor affecting CSP, particularly at the 
national level. In fact, Matten and Moon (2008) argue that “higher levels of union membership in 
Europe resulted in labor-related issues being negotiated at a sectoral or national, rather than corporate 
level” (p.408) compared to the United States. We expect that in countries where labor unions are more 
prominent, firms will perform better on the CSP index since powerful unions may push for extended 
benefits for employees, focusing more on health and safety provisions, progressive labor relations 
policies, more workplace amenities, and may push for more engaged community involvement. The 
labor force may even increase overall awareness within society by acting as the firm’s ambassador for 
environmental and social policies. Prior literature also shows that labor unions can even influence 
social performance at non-union firms: McWilliams & Siegel (2001) note that this influence on non-
union firms is analogous to the well-documented “threat effect” of unions on non-union wages 
(Freeman & Medoff, 1983; Mills, 1994): non-union corporations may voluntarily adopt progressive 
policies to actually avoid worker unionization (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Foulkes, 1980).  
However, prior literature on the relationship between a corporation’s slack resources and 
social responsibility (e.g. Buchholtz  et al., 1999; Seifert et al., 2004) offers a plausible alternative: in 
cases where labor power is higher, firms are left with relatively fewer resources to devote to 
environmental and social performance, and thus the relationship between labor power and CSP may 
become ambiguous. This argument is based on two assumptions: first, that CSP is the result of the 
utilization of the firm’s slack resources and not an integral part of the firm’s business model or its 
corporate culture as more recent empirical work seems to suggest (Eccles et. al., 2011). Second, it 
assumes an underlying trade-off in the utilization of resources for which evidence is limited, and an 
unrealistic independence among stakeholder interests: it is highly unlikely that labour unions would 
push for workplace amenities for example, while remaining indifferent to an adverse impact on the 
local community or the environment; typically employees originate from the local communities, 15 
 
and/or may well reside in the firm’s vicinity and be directly affected by its environmental impact. 
Accordingly, we predict a net positive relationship between strength of labor unions and CSP.  
Hypothesis 5: In countries where labor unions have more power, corporations will score 
higher on the CSP index. 
In addition to the labor system, the regulation and production of human resources (i.e. the 
education system) can also impact the variation in CSP. Prior work shows that firms with strong CSP 
attract and retain higher quality employees since CSP sends signals to prospective job applicants 
about what it would be like to work for the focal firm (Turban & Greening, 1997; Greening & Turban, 
2000). This finding has implications for how firms compete in the market for skilled human capital: 
they will be more likely to recruit talent by improving their social performance since such skilled and 
talented employees increasingly choose to work for firms with high CSP. It follows then, that the 
more limited the skilled human capital availability is in a country, the more likely that firms will 
compete by enhancing their social performance in order to differentiate themselves as employers and 
become more attractive to prospective highly-skilled job applicants. Therefore, CSP is inversely 
related to skilled labor availability.  In fact, existing evidence already shows that in industries with 
relatively limited skilled labor availability, firms are particularly proactive in their CSR activities 
(Siegel, 1999). 
Hypothesis 6: In countries with higher availability of trained and skilled human capital, 
corporations will score lower on the CSP index. 
Financial System 
Capital providers are important stakeholders for organizations since they finance business 
operations (Freeman, Harrison & Wicks, 2007). Yet significant diversity exists in the financing 
arrangements around the world: a critical feature that varies is the processes by which capital is made 
available and priced (Whitley, 1999).  On the one end, some financial systems are market based (e.g. 
United States) where actors “mobilize and distribute capital largely through large and liquid markets 
which trade and price financial claims through the usual commodity-market processes” (Whitely, 
1999, p.49). At the other end, credit-based financial systems (e.g. France, Germany) “typically have 
weak and fairly illiquid or thin capital markets, which play only a minor role in mobilizing and 16 
 
pricing investment funds” (Whitely, 1999, p.49). In such financial systems, the dominant institutions 
are large banks and/or state agencies and ministries who, in times of capital shortages, make 
allocation decisions through administrative processes rather than open market operations. 
In market based financial systems with well-developed equity markets, corporations strive to 
secure the most favorable financing terms. Typically, financing decisions by the markets are based on 
short-term profitability and therefore, within such systems, that is what firms focus on maximizing 
(Teoh, Welch & Wong, 1998a; Teoh, Welch & Wong, 1998b). This form of short-termism however, 
is likely to limit investments in CSR activities since the benefits from such activities usually 
materialize in the long-run (e.g. “reputation building”, Fomburn & Shanley, 1990; Weigelt & 
Camerer, 1988). Meanwhile, intense competition for financing may push firms towards behaving in 
socially irresponsible ways in order to survive. Thus, they may engage in actions such as misleading 
customers, abusing labor, miss-communicating corporate performance, and compromising product 
safety (Weinstein 1968; Schneiberg, 1999; McCraw, 1984; Jones, 1991; Kolko, 1963). For these two 
reasons, we expect that corporations located in countries that are closer to the market-based model, 
with deep and large stock markets, will fare worse on the CSP index. 
On the other hand, market based financial systems are better structured to allocate capital 
resources more efficiently compared to credit-based financial systems which are based primarily on 
administrative processes of capital allocation. This may be true particularly during periods of high 
growth when shortages of available financing become more acute (Whitley, 1999). Since prior work 
has shown that more capital-constrained firms score lower along CSP dimensions (Hong, Kubik & 
Scheinkman, 2011), we would expect that corporations in credit-based financial systems will face 
relatively more capital constraints and therefore, will fare worse on the CSP index. In other words, 
corporations in market-based financial systems will face fewer capital constraints and therefore will 
fare better on the CSP index.  
To date, a long literature has debated whether the markets are indeed myopic (i.e. short-term 
oriented) with empirical results being mixed, often even suggesting that the reverse is true; that 
markets are long-term oriented – at least for some firm activities. Importantly, some studies find 
significant positive stock returns associated with the announcement of research and development 17 
 
(R&D) projects (Jarrell, Lehn, & Marr, 1985; Woolridge, 1988; Woolridge & Snow, 1990; Bizjak, 
Brickley, & Coles, 1993), thus suggesting a relatively efficient allocation of capital in that markets 
reward firm activities that are consistent with long-term value creation. Therefore, to the extent that 
CSR activities are similar to R&D projects in their long-term orientation, we expect that in countries 
with market-based financial systems, capital will be more efficiently allocated in general and to its 
potentially long-term value creating activities in particular. Thus, firms within such countries will face 
fewer capital constraints and will fare better on CSP. In sum, we expect the efficiency of the capital 
allocation process in market based systems to be a more salient mechanism that the potential short-
termism of the market. 
Hypothesis 7: In countries with a more market-based financial system, corporations will 
score higher on the CSP index. 
In addition to the type of the financial system in place, we also argue that the total amount of 
available capital in the country that demands high CSP as an investment criterion will also affect CSP 
variation. Prior work shows that in fact, in the past ten years the amount of assets under management 
by socially responsible investment (SRI) funds has dramatically increased, reaching to more than $4 
trillion according to some estimates (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2010). Moreover, in a comprehensive 
review of the literature, Sparkes and Cowton (2004) suggest that SRI “has become an investment 
philosophy adopted by a growing proportion of large investment institutions”. We expect that in 
countries with larger amounts of such capital available, firms with fare better on the CSP index for 
two reasons. First, as Mackey, Mackey & Barney (2007) argue, the higher the demand for socially 
responsible investment opportunities, the higher is the likely increase in market value for a firm that 
improves its CSP; according to their theory, “the opportunity to invest in a firm engaging in socially 
responsible activities is a “product” firms sell to current and potential investors” (p.830). 
Consequently, we argue that in countries where a socially responsible stock market index exists - 
indicating the presence of sufficient amounts of capital for SRI investments - firms will strive to 
improve their CSP as a means through which to attract this capital. This mechanism therefore, is 
similar to the one argued for the recruitment of high skilled capital. In the competitive markets for 
inputs (i.e. labor and capital), CSP may act as a critical point of differentiation.  Second, the 18 
 
development of a large enough SRI market could potentially reduce the cost of capital for firms with 
high CSP and thus provide additional market based incentives for firms to actually improve their CSP 
(Dhaliwal et al. 2011). Because of these two reasons, we expect a positive relation between the 
existence of a responsible stock market index and CSP. 
Hypothesis 8: In countries where a socially responsible stock market index exists, 
corporations will score higher on the CSP index. 
Cultural System 
Finally, Whitley (1999) argues that “the norms governing trust and authority relations are 
crucial because they structure exchange relationships between business partners and between 
employers and employees. They also affect the development of collective identities and prevalent 
modes of eliciting compliance and commitment within authority systems” (p.51). In what ways then, 
could the cultural system affect variation in CSP? As Matten & Moon (2008) argue, the cultural 
systems of the U.S. and Europe, “have generated very different broad assumptions about society, 
business and government.”  Whereas in the U.S. an ethic for wealthy businessmen and for 
corporations to “give back” to society has emerged, in Europe a greater “cultural reliance on 
representative organizations, be they political parties, unions, employers’ associations, or churches, 
and the state” has been instituted instead (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Matten & Moon, 2008). 
At a more micro level, work by Crossland & Hambrick (2011) shows that several cultural 
traits have a direct impact on managerial discretion, which they conceptualize as the “latitude of 
managerial action” (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Thus we expect that cultural traits will also 
impact managerial decision-making related to CSP. One such fundamental element of the cultural 
system that has been previously identified (e.g. Aguinis & Henle, 2003; Gelfand et al., 2004; 
Crossland & Hambrick, 2011; Triandis, 1994) is linked to the issue of autonomous vs. consensus-
based actions. Societies characterized by high levels of individualism typically allow for a larger 
margin of individual initiative and are more willing to tolerate unilateral decision-making. In 
countries with low levels of individualism, the members of society form expectations that decision-
making processes will be broader, more participatory and more consultative.  19 
 
Transferring this finding in the CSP domain, Matten & Moon (2008) argue that in 
individualistic societies  that provide discretion to private economic actors one would expect to 
encounter strong elements of explicit CSR; where explicit CSR is defined as “the result of a 
deliberate, voluntary, and often strategic (Porter & Kramer, 2006) decision of a corporation” 
(emphasis added, p.410). In other words, in more individualistic cultures managers are more likely to 
make their mark by choosing explicit decisions and actions, both in the CSP domain, but also more 
broadly. For example, in countries with a Roman Catholic heritage, which emphasizes the collective 
more than the Protestant heritage of following one’s individual faith, philanthropy is typically 
anonymous or low-key since attaching one’s name to a philanthropic act brings in an element of 
‘selfish’ self-promotion; in Protestant countries this is much less of a concern.
3 Analogously, in 
individualistic societies firms are more likely to undertake explicit CSR activities in response to 
perceived expectations by a wider range of stakeholders.  To the extent that CSP measures the 
outcomes of such voluntary and explicit CSR initiatives we therefore expect that it to be higher in 
individualistic societies compared to societies in which CSR assumes an implicit form and is 
established as an institutional substitute (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010). 
Hypothesis 9: In countries that are characterized by higher levels of individualism, 
corporations will score higher on the CSP index. 
  Another critical institution of any cultural system is the characterization of the relative status 
of leaders within civil society. Cultural research argues that in societies where such power distance 
(Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004) is lower, business leaders are seen as “mere facilitators or 
figureheads and less as empowered decision makers, [thus] experience greater normative constraint” 
(Crossland & Hambrick, 2011, p.801). Conversely, in societies with higher power distance, 
“stakeholders will be more likely to allow far-reaching executive actions, more likely to acquiesce in 
the face of executive actions, and less likely to question decision makers or the basis upon which 
actions are taken” (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011, p. 801).  
                                                           
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point and this example to us. 20 
 
  On the one hand, high power distance can generate a sense of obligation on the part of 
executives or other high ranked officials to pay special attention to the expectations and needs of key 
stakeholders and society more broadly; it will urge them in other words, to act as society’s nobility in 
pursuing CSR objectives with their actions (Waldman et al., 2006). Accordingly, we would expect the 
CSP index in high power distance societies to be higher. 
On the other hand, as Waldman et al. (2006) have shown, high power distance may be 
negatively associated with CSP: managers in high power distance societies may be inclined to care 
more about their own interests rather than the interests of society. Therefore, they will be more likely 
to use their power for the pursuit of personal benefits (Carl et al., 2004) and may not particularly care 
about building long-term relationships with key stakeholders or feel responsible for the broader social 
welfare (Waldman et al., 2006). Moreover, Cohen et. al. (1996) find that in societies with a high 
power distance, actors are more likely to view questionable business practice as ethical compared to 
actors in low power distance societies. Therefore, under these conditions we would expect CSP to be 
lower.  Taking into account prior empirical findings (e.g. Waldman et al., 2006; Ringov & Zollo, 
2007) we expect this latter mechanism to be more salient in the CSP context and therefore we predict 
a net negative relationship between power distance and CSP. 
Hypothesis 10: In countries with higher levels of power distance, corporations will score 
lower on the CSP index. 
SAMPLE, DATA AND METHODS 
Sample and Data Collection 
  We construct our sample by combining a number of different databases (see Table 1). We 
obtained environmental, social and governance (ESG) metrics from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 that 
specializes in providing objective, relevant, auditable and systematic ESG information and investment 
analysis tools to professional investors. It is estimated that investors representing more than 
€2.5trillion assets under management use the ASSET4 data to build their portfolios by integrating 
ESG data into their traditional investment analysis.  We collected stock market data from DataStream, 
analyst coverage data from I/B/E/S, and accounting data from WorldScope. The nation-level variables 
come from multiple sources including the IMD World Competitiveness report, the World Federation 21 
 
of Exchanges, World Bank, the CIA Factbook, Botero et al. (2004), La Porta et al. (2006) and 
Hofstede (1997, 2001). The resulting sample includes in total 12,764 observations with available data 
for all variables for a total of 7 years: 2002 to 2008. The sample primarily comprises of firms from 
Japan, USA and the UK. However, a substantial number of observations come from Continental 
European countries, Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore. Our sample includes information from 42 
countries and a large number of individual firms: 930 firms in 2002, 943 firms in 2003, 1,773 firms in 
2004, 2,188 firms in 2005, 2,209 firms in 2006, 2,391 firms in 2007 and finally, 2,330 firms in 2008.  
Dependent Variables: Measuring CSP and the ASSET4 Dataset  
  In prior literature, constructing a truly representative measure of CSP has been rather 
challenging due to: a) the multi-dimensionality of the theoretical construct and b) because 
measurements of a single aspect of CSP (e.g. corporate philanthropy) provide a limited perspective of 
the firm’s performance in the more general social and environmental sense (Lydenberg et al., 1986; 
Wolfe and Aupperle, 1991). In fact, Waddock and Graves (1997) highlighted the “need for a 
multidimensional measure applied across a wide range of industries and larger samples of companies” 
(p.304). Meanwhile, a wide variety of CSP measures have been used by researchers: forced-choice 
survey instruments (Aupperle, 1991; Aupperle et al., 1985), the Fortune reputational and social 
responsibility index or Moskowitz’ reputational scales (Bowman and Haire, 1975; McGuire et al., 
1988; Preston and O'Bannon, 1997), content analysis of corporate documents (Wolfe, 1991), 
behavioral and perceptual measures (Wokutch and McKinney, 1991), and measures from case study 
methodologies (Clarkson, 1991). 
  For this study, we utilize a global ESG dataset from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 who have 
collected data and scored firms on ESG dimensions since fiscal 2002. Specially trained research 
analysts collect 900 evaluation points per firm and according to guidelines all the primary data used 
must be objective and publically available. Typical data sources include stock exchange filings, CSR 
and annual reports, non-governmental organizations’ websites, and various news sources. After 
gathering the ESG data the analysts transform it into consistent units to enable quantitative analysis of 
this qualitative data. Indicatively, we note that: a) for environmental factors the data would typically 22 
 
include information on energy used, water recycled, CO2 emissions, waste recycled, and spills and 
pollution controversies and b) for social factors the data would typically include employee turnover, 
injury rate, accidents, training hours, women employees, donations, and health & safety controversies. 
According to Thomson Reuters ASSET4, every data point question goes through a multi-step 
verification and process control, which includes a series of data entry checks, automated quality rules 
and historical comparisons to ensure a high level of accuracy, timeliness and quality. Based on these 
data points, Thomson Reuters ASSET4 offers a comprehensive platform for establishing customizable 
benchmarks for the assessment of corporate performance. Subsequently, these 900 data points are 
used as inputs to a default equal-weighted framework to calculate 250 key performance indicators 
(KPIs)and further organize those in18 categories within 4 pillars: a) environmental performance score, 
b) social performance score c) corporate governance score and d) economic performance score (see 
also Appendix 1). For every year, a firm receives a z-score for each of the pillars, benchmarking its 
performance with the rest of the firms. 
  In our work, we use the environmental and social metrics to construct a composite CSP index. 
When constructing such an index an aggregation issue arises: what weights should one assign to these 
two dimensions of CSP? The same issue was faced in the past by scholars that used the Kinder, 
Lyndenberg and Domini (KLD) dataset. Some studies used differential category weights based on 
either (subjective) academic opinions about category importance (Graves and Waddock, 1994; 1997) 
or used the analytic hierarchy process to derive weights (Ruf, et al., 1993). The literature to date 
however, has not identified a theoretically derived ranking of importance for the various stakeholder 
groups as a guide for empirical work. Accordingly, we follow the convention established by Waddock 
and Graves (1997), Hillman and Keim (2001) and Waldman, Siegel and Javidan (2006) among others 
who used the KLD dataset, in constructing a composite CSP index by assigning equal importance 
(and thus equal weights) to each of the two pillars. In particular, the variable CSP Index is the equally 
weighted average of the social and environmental score for the focal firm for every year in our 
sample. For robustness, we also performed a principal components analysis (PCA) and in unreported 
results we used the first estimated component as our dependent variable with virtually no change in 23 
 
our results. This is because the PCA analysis assigned approximately equal weights on the social and 
the environmental scores. 
Independent Variables 
  Nation-level variables are described in detail in Table 1. With regards to the choice of 
institutional variables, we rely extensively on a large literature from economics, sociology, and 
political science (see relevant references in Table 1) and we also remain as close as possible to the 
theoretical constructs suggested by Whitley (1999) . Specifically, the political system variables cover 
laws and regulations that encourage competition in a country (Competition and regulation), laws that 
limit self-dealing of corporate insiders thus protecting shareholders (Anti-self dealing index), the level 
of corruption in each country (Absence of corruption), and the degree to which chief executives and 
the largest party in congress have left or center political orientation (Left ideology). Labor market and 
education variables cover the extent to which employee unions are powerful within society, measured 
as the extent to which employees are organized in unions (Union density), and whether skilled labor is 
readily available in the country (Availability of skilled labor). Financial system variables include the 
average leverage ratio (Current Debt over Assets) among firms in an economy, that captures the 
extent to which the financial system adheres to a credit- or equity-market based model (i.e. a higher 
leverage ratio signifies that firms depend more on debt for their financing rather than equity markets), 
and the existence (i.e. an indicator variable) of a socially responsible stock market index (SRI Index). 
We characterize the cultural system using two well established measures of cultural distance by 
Hofstede (1997, 2001): Power Distance Index and Individualism. 
As additional controls in our specifications we include country variables that measure how 
globalized and competitive is the economy of each country (Balance of Trade and Trade), the quality 
of its infrastructure (Basic infrastructure) and the sheer size of its capital market (Market 
Capitalization). We include these variables to mitigate any correlated omitted variable bias arising 
from the influence of globalization, competitiveness and basic infrastructure of an economy on CSP. 
We also include a number of firm and industry level variables as potential factors affecting CSP. All 
firm and industry level variables are defined in Table 1. We expect CSP to increase in firm 
performance (Return-on-Assets) and to decrease in firm risk (stock return Volatility) (Campbell, 24 
 
2007). Moreover, we expect CSP to increase for firms that compete through providing innovative and 
differentiated services and products (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). We use as proxies for the product 
characteristics of a firm and the degree to which a firm competes on differentiation, the Market-to-
Book ratio, and Research and Development expenses over sales. CSP will be higher for larger (Firm 
size), more diversified (Number of segments) (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001), and more visible (Analyst 
coverage and American depository receipt) firms (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2010).  These last two 
measures have been used extensively in prior literature that has confirmed their validity as proxies for 
a firm’s visibility (e.g. Lang, Lins, and Miller 2003; Baker, Nofsinger and Weaver 2002; Bhushan 
1989; ). Finally, CSP will be lower in more competitive industries (Herfindal Index) (Campbell, 
2007). All the specifications include industry fixed effects based on the Fama-French (1997) industry 
classification to account for systematic differences in CSP across industries as well as year fixed 
effects to capture potential time trends in CSP. 
RESULTS 
Summary statistics 
  Panel A of table 2 presents the average score and standard deviation for the social and 
environmental pillars and the CSP Index. We note that significant variation exists both within as well 
as across countries in CSP. Panel B of the same table presents the distribution of observations using 
the Fama-French (1997) industry classification across countries for all the years in our sample. Table 
3 reports summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical specifications. The social and 
environmental scores as well as the composite CSP Index range between zero and one by 
construction, and have a mean that is close to 0.50. Furthermore, figure 1 graphs the average social 
and environmental scores and CPI Index across all countries over time revealing an upward trend in 
all scores between the year 2002 and 2008, albeit it is economically insignificant. Moreover, table 4 
shows the annual mean and standard deviation of the independent variables of interest across 
countries over time. Finally, the two panels of table 5 present the complete correlation matrix where 
several of the variables capturing variation at the level of national institutions exhibit significant 
associations with the CSP Index.  25 
 
  To capture the relative importance of firm, industry, and nation-level factors in explaining 
variation in CSP across firms, we perform a variance of components analysis using a maximum 
likelihood methodology (VARCOMP in SAS). As a robustness check we used alternative methods 
which produced qualitatively similar results. We find that explainable variation in the CSP Index is 
attributed as follows: 70% firm, 11% industry, 2% year, and 17% nation-level effects, respectively. 
Since prior work has found that firm size may explain variation in CSP, we re-estimate the variance of 
components analysis on a subsample of the five largest firms in each country in every year between 
2002 and 2008. We find that nation-level effects explain 35% of the explainable variation in the CSP 
index whereas, firm and industry effects account for 55% and 10% of the explainable variation, 
respectively. This finding suggests that the impact of nation-level institutions is particularly salient 
for this subset of firms which also happen to be the major influencers within the countries in our 
sample due to their dominant market presence in the specific country context. 
These results suggest that nation-level factors are important in explaining total variation in 
CSP, particularly when they are compared to corresponding estimates by prior studies in the field of 
strategy. Such studies decomposed the variance of financial performance and found that the industry 
effects explained between 15% (Rumelt, 1991) to 19% (McGahan & Porter, 1997; 2002) of overall 
financial performance variation. They thus established empirically the importance of the strategic 
positioning school (Porter, 1980). Our findings here therefore, that are of similar magnitude, seem to 
suggest an equally important role of nation-level institutions in explain variation in CSP.   
Regression results for full sample 
  For all specifications, we estimate the coefficients using the ordinary least squares 
methodology with clustered (at the firm level) and robust standard errors and industry and year fixed 
effects. Moreover, we use lagged independent variables. For the firm and industry level controls all 
variables are calculated in t-1 while the CSP construct is calculated in year t. Country level variables 
that are measured every year we also calculate in year t-1. Finally, country variables that do not vary 
over time are measured before our first year of CSP data and as a result they are lagged by 
construction. Column (0) of table 6 shows the results of the analysis using the CSP Index as 
dependent variable and omitting any nation-level variables. Column (1) of table 6 presents the main 26 
 
regression results of our analysis based on the full sample and the CSP Index whereas columns (2) 
and (3) use the social and environmental scores as dependent variables. The results in columns (2) and 
(3) are qualitatively the same as column (1) and therefore we focus the rest of our discussion on 
column (1). 
Political System  
Consistent with hypothesis 1, our results confirm that laws and regulations that promote 
market competition (Competition and Regulation) are associated with a lower CSP index. This effect 
is economically large, suggesting that all else equal, a firm that is headquartered in a country in the 
25
th percentile of Competition and Regulation, relative to the 75
th percentile, will have almost 20% 
higher CSP.  Hypothesis 2 is also confirmed: we find evidence that when managers have the power to 
take decisions that might not be in the best interest of shareholders and potentially satisfy other 
stakeholders, CSP is higher. Moreover, we find that CSP is significantly higher for corporations in 
countries where corruption is less widespread, consistent with hypothesis 3. The economic effect is 
one of the largest at 0.13 for an interquartile change in Absence of Corruption. Finally, we find that 
firms in countries characterized politically by a Left ideology score lower on the CSP Index, 
supporting the view that CSP is an institutional substitute (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010). The 
estimated coefficients suggest that an interquartile increase in Left ideology decreases the CSP index 
by 0.08. 
Education and Labor System 
   As predicted by hypothesis 5, in countries with a higher Union Labor Density corporations 
fare better on the CSP index suggesting that unions put pressure on corporations to improve the social 
benefits provided to workers and can also increase corporate awareness of environmental 
consequences. The results also support the positive directionality of hypothesis 6, predicting that in 
countries with higher availability of skilled human capital (Availability of Skilled Labor) corporations 
will fare worse on the CSP Index since the abundance of highly skilled employees mitigates the need 
for higher CSP in order to attract and retain them.  
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In testing hypothesis 7, we find a negative and significant coefficient on Country Debt over 
Assets, showing that in countries with a credit-based model corporations are more likely to fare worse 
on the CSP index. This finding is important because it confirms that the efficiency of the capital 
allocation process in capital-market-based financial systems relative to the credit-based systems 
outweighs any potential negative impact on CSP due to the short-term focus of corporations. In other 
words, the potentially longer-term horizon of debt-holders in a credit-based financial system is not 
enough to outweigh the inefficiencies caused by the allocation of capital by administrative processes 
rather than markets. Thus, firms in such systems are more likely to face significant capital constraints 
and subsequently fare worse in terms of CSP. Interestingly, the existence of a Socially Responsible 
Index (SRI) exhibits no relation with the CSP Index and therefore, hypothesis 8 is not supported by 
the empirical analysis. We think that this might be so because despite their significant growth in 
recent years, SRI funds remain a relatively small part of the total market. However, as SRI funds keep 
growing significantly over time and differentially across countries, future work may seek to 
understand their potential impact on CSP variation. 
 Cultural System 
  Finally, we find evidence that cultural traits play a significant role in explaining CSP variation 
across firms. Our results confirm hypothesis 9 according to which in countries that are characterized 
by higher levels of individualism (Individualism) corporations fare better on the CSP index. In 
individualistic societies that actively encourage broader discretion of economic actors, CSR 
materializes in a more explicit, proactive and strategic form and consequently, it enhances CSP. 
Surprisingly, hypothesis 10 is not confirmed. Instead, the positive and significant coefficient on the 
Power Distance Index indicates that a higher power distance generates a sense of noble obligation on 
the part of business executives to pay attention to the needs of their stakeholders and society more 
broadly.  
  In summary, our empirical findings confirm the majority of our hypotheses but also, the 
estimated economic effects provide an indication with regards to the relative importance of different 
elements of the NBS in driving CSP variation. In particular, the results show that the political system 
is the most significant factor affecting CSP variation: the economic effect of an interquartile change in 28 
 
Competition and Regulation on CSP is 0.09 suggesting that a firm that is headquartered in a country 
in the 25
th percentile of Competition and Regulation, relative country in the 75
th percentile, will have 
almost 20% higher CSP. Similarly, for the Anti-self Dealing Index, Absence of Corruption and Left 
Ideology the estimated effects on CSP are 0.04, 0.13 and 0.08, respectively. Thus, we note that the 
estimated effect for Absence of Corruption is the largest economic effect across all of the independent 
variables. With regards to the Education and Labor system, we find that the economic effects are 0.05 
and 0.04 for the Availability of Skilled Labor and Union Density, respectively. We also estimate the 
economic effects for the Cultural system to be 0.03 for Individualism, and 0.06 for Power Distance. 
  In contrast, for the financial system, only the coefficient on Country debt over assets obtains 
significance with an estimated economic effect of 0.03. This finding suggests that the structure of the 
financial system does not exert a significance influence on CSP. This may be due to the fact that the 
majority of actors within the financial system, such as investors and investment analysts, have only 
recently attempted to incorporate CSP in their assessments and capital-allocation decisions. More 
generally, based on the estimated economic effects, we find that apart from the political system the 
rest of the systems rank as follows: education and labor system, cultural system, and financial system.  
Country, industry and firm control variables.  
Most of the control variables that we include at the country, the industry and the firm level 
obtain significance in the expected direction as theorized by prior literature. At the country level, we 
find that corporations in countries running on deficits (Balance of Trade) and with higher levels of 
international trade (Trade) fare better on the CSP Index. Moreover, the size of the equity market itself 
(Market Capitalization) does not appear to drive variation in the CSP Index. At the industry level, we 
find that higher concentration as measured by the Herfindal Index is positively related to CSP, 
confirming prior work by Koerber & Griffin (2011). The firm level controls reveal that CSP is related 
to the risk-return profile of a firm: better performing firms (higher Return-on-Assets) are more 
socially responsible, consistent with the argument set forth by Campbell (2007). Moreover, riskier 
firms (higher Volatility) fare worse on the CSP index. Firm Size as well as R&D expenditure exhibits 
significant positive association with the CSP Index whereas firm scope, as measured by the Number 
of Segments the firm competes in, does not seem to affect CSP. Visibility (Analyst coverage) of a firm 29 
 
is significantly and positively related to CSP, consistent with prior findings showing that the returns 
of CSR activities are higher for more visible firms (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2010). Finally, we find that 
firms closely held by investors (% of shares closely held) fare worse on the CSP Index, indicating that 
wide dispersion of equity ownership is, on average, linked to better social performance. In general, 
these findings highlight the key role of firm and industry level factors in explaining CSP variation in 
addition to the institutional factors. Moreover, they raise important questions with regards to the 
institutional conditions under which some of the firm and industry level factors may become more 
salient than others. Future research may investigate how firm and industry level factors interact with 
institutional structures to affect CSP variation. 
Regression results for domestic and multinational corporations  
A potential limitation of our analysis is that a number of corporations operate in multiple 
countries and as a result they are subject to the influence of multiple nation-level institutions. In our 
baseline specification we include national-level institutional variables of the country in which the firm 
is incorporated. To address this concern we perform a number of robustness checks.  
  First, we identify “domestic” firms by requiring that less than 10% of their assets are 
identified as foreign assets in their financial statements. 7,288 firm-year observations satisfy this 
criterion. Column (4) of table 6 shows the results for this subsample of firms. We find that our results 
hold virtually unchanged for this subsample of firms albeit with some minor differences in the 
magnitude of the effects (e.g. Left Ideology). We also identified “domestic” firms by imposing a more 
restrictive filter of 0% for foreign assets: again, the results remained qualitatively unchanged and 
therefore we do not report them here. Another method we employed to address the issue of 
multinational corporations was to identify all their operations across countries in terms of the level of 
sales, and empirically estimate the impact of home (incorporated) and host nation-level institutional 
factors concurrently. We used the geographic segment disclosures from WorldScope to identify the 
countries in which multinational corporations operated. Due to the very limited availability of such 
fine-grained information, our sample was drastically reduced to 857 observations (200 unique firms). 
Table 7 presents the results of this analysis. Since multinational corporations operated in more than 
one country beyond their home country (typically in 2-3 host countries), we calculated the values for 30 
 
the host country institutional variables as the weighted average of the values in all host countries that 
the corporation operated in weighted by the fraction of overall sales. Generally, the results of table 7 
confirm the importance of home country institutions even after we explicitly control for the impact of 
host country institutions. In two cases, Country Debt over Assets and Individualism, the coefficients of 
interest lose significance compared to the baseline specification of column (1) in table 6. This 
however, may be the result of the drastic drop in the number of observations and thus a potential 
inability of the model to efficiently estimate the coefficients. 
  Table 7 is also revealing in terms of identifying the impact of host country institutions. 
Clearly, this is a topic that remains open for future research but we note here that host country 
institutions appear to have a different impact on CSP compared to home country institutions. In 
particular, holding all home country effects constant, CSP is higher when a company is in a host 
country with laws that promote a more competitive environment and in a more corrupt country. Both 
results suggest that a corporation might improve its CSP when diversifying in countries with these 
characteristics in order to signal its quality and attract new business. For example, in countries with 
relatively high corruption, a good CSP might serve as a credible signal that the company is doing 
business in an ethical way and as a result it can attract non-corrupt business partners. Similar to home 
country effects, host Country Debt over Assets and Individualism have negative and positive 
coefficients respectively. 
  Finally, we re-run our baseline specification and excluded observations from the U.S., the 
U.K. and Japan to address any potential bias in our results due to the over-representation of these 
countries. In particular, we examined the robustness of the results to subsamples that excluded each 
country, two of the countries, or all three of them at the same time. We find qualitatively similar 
results (unreported) to the baseline specification of column (1) in Table 6, suggesting that our findings 
are not driven by anyone country alone.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
  A small number of prior studies have articulated how different factors affect CSP variation 
(e.g. Campbell, 2007; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001) yet no empirical studies have explored CSP 
heterogeneity across more than 40 countries worldwide. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence 31 
 
of the profound role that nation-level institutions play in explaining this CSP variation as measured by 
our constructed CSP Index. In doing so, we utilize a global ESG dataset from Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4 covering more than 2,000 firms in 42 countries around the world for 7 years. 
  Drawing from institutional theory, our overarching hypothesis is that nation-level institutional 
variation significantly impacts the observed variation in CSP across corporations. For each country in 
our sample we classify institutions into four distinct systems following the classification scheme 
proposed by Whitley (1999): a) the political system b) the education and labor system c) the financial 
system and d) the cultural system. Within each system, we use established institutional metrics that 
have been previously identified in a long literature originating from economics, political science, 
cultural research and institutional theory, to provide a comprehensive theoretical model with regards 
to the mechanisms through which several nation-level institutions, constituting elements of distinct 
NBS,  impact CSP variation. Although we provide preliminary empirical evidence about the impact of 
home versus host country institutions, we also suggest that in future work scholars should focus on 
providing a more nuanced understanding and a more comprehensive theoretical argument 
characterizing the relative impact of such institutions on CSP; a task that falls outside the scope of the 
current paper. 
Institutional theory has long established that business organizations are embedded within 
broader social structures, comprising of different types of institutions, which exert significant 
influence on their behavior and consequently impact the corporations’ strategic decision making and 
organizational outcomes (e.g. Campbell, 2007; Campbell, Hollingsworth & Lindberg, 1991). This is 
exactly the reason why in this paper we argue that CSP, a key performance outcome of a 
corporation’s undertaking of CSR activities, will also be profoundly influenced by such institutional 
pressures. We find that within NBS, all four systems are significant factors affecting CSP variation 
with the political system being the most and the financial system being the least important in terms of 
estimated economic effects. Future work adopting a more dynamic approach could seek to understand 
how these distinct systems of institutions interact or co-evolve over time and how such processes 
affect CSP variation.  More generally, future work may seek to understand the conditions under which 
some systems become more salient than others in driving variation in CSP. 32 
 
By highlighting the role of institutions, our work also raises critical questions around 
multinational corporations and their social performance vis-a-vis the increasing pressures on countries 
to open up to globalization. Global trends towards increasing deregulation founded on the belief that 
institutional constraints hinder efficiency and profitability (Campbell, 2007) should be carefully re-
evaluated: an increasing amount of evidence suggests that enhanced social performance is not 
contrary to but rather synergistic to economic performance (Eccles, Ioannou & Serafeim, 2011). To 
the extent that institutions contribute to enhanced social performance, extreme deregulation that 
significantly reduces the impact of institutions could, at the same time, reduce economic performance 
in a context of rapidly shifting social trends in regards to environmental and social issues.     
This is not to imply however, that other factors, including institutional factors at the level of 
the firm or the industry, are not important. On the contrary, we believe that these factors are key and 
we include them as independent control variables in our empirical models. In fact, our results support 
the prominent role of firm and industry factors and generate questions around the interaction effects 
between these factors and institutions in affecting CSP variation. In this paper however, as a first step, 
we chose to focus on nation-level institutions due to the relative lack of empirical research on this 
issue and because nation-level institutions explain a significant portion of the total variation in the 
CSP Index. In fact, scholars have suggested that CSP is enhanced by convincing managers that CSR 
activities are the right thing to do ethically or that it is in some form in their self-interest (Campbell, 
2007; Prahalad & Hammond, 2003). By providing a three level empirical model that accounts for 
these factors in addition to the institutional environment, our work shows that such pleas may indeed 
contribute positively to CSP but at the same time, we highlight that nation-level institutions are 
important, particularly if we consider the impact that multinational corporations globally have on 
mitigating acute social and environmental issues. Accordingly, future work should seek to understand 
further how the evolution of institutions affects not only economic as well as social performance at 
the firm level, but also what the impact of an enhanced social and economic performance is at the 
country level, in terms of competitiveness, social cohesion, and sustainability. 
The finding that financial system characteristics have less influence on CSP relative to the 
political and the education and labor systems raises some interesting questions about the role of 33 
 
capital markets in society. Investors have traditionally pursued solely financial performance 
disregarding the social performance of their portfolios. Given the increasing assets under management 
of SRI funds this is likely to change. Future research could examine the evolution of SRI funds and 
their impact on CSP in different institutional contexts. 
With this paper we make contributions both to the theoretical as well as the empirical 
literature on CSP. First, we answer the call for more systematic research for understanding the broader 
spectrum of factors that affect CSP variation, as well as the call for investigating the influence of 
variation in nation-level institutions on CSP variation. The theoretical section of this paper draws 
extensively from but also integrates across strands of institutional theory, cultural research, 
economics, and political science to suggest specific causal mechanisms through which macro 
structures, such as institutions, contribute towards the observed CSP heterogeneity across firms. We 
also contribute to the growing literature within international business (IB) that seeks to understand the 
broader issue of institutional diversity and its implications for IB studies (e.g. Jackson and Deeg, 
2008). 
  Empirically, our paper is the first one to provide evidence for the impact of nation-level 
institutions on CSP covering such a large number of countries, industries and firms. Our models 
investigate a complete multi-level impact model (firm, industry and national levels) and as such they 
are able to explain 47% of the variance in the CSP Index with observable characteristics. Throughout 
this paper, we regard institutions as being exogenous with respect to specific organizational outcomes 
of corporations (i.e. CSP), in order to attribute causality to the established relationships. In fact, 
Whitley (1998) argues that NBSs are deeply embedded into the national economies and are 
fundamentally contingent on their specific histories, such that they are unlikely to be restructured over 
a short period of time, or simply due to internationalization. While we believe this is a valid 
assumption for our sample that covers 7 years of data, it is certainly a valid assumption for developed 
economies in particular, where institutional characteristics are well established and to a large extent 
determined by colonization and the historical origins of their laws (La Porta et al. 1998). It might be 
less valid however, for emerging economies where the institutional architecture is evolving to 
accommodate the changing social, political and economic landscape. Future research therefore, may 34 
 
consider longer time horizons, and employing a more dynamic approach may investigate how the 
evolution of institutions in emerging markets affects firms’ CSP; it may even consider how the 
corporations’ social responsibilities potentially impact the evolution of institutions in such countries.  
  We note additional caveats of our analysis. To reach any level of CSP, firms need to first 
adopt a range of CSR practices and strategies. Whereas in our work we focus on the impact of nation-
level institutions on CSP - rather than the impact on adoption and implementation of CSR practices 
and strategies - future work may seek to understand this latter relationship better and deeper. Yet, to 
the extent that a gap exists between our operationalization of CSP and the firms’ CSR practices and 
strategies, our analysis essentially suggests and empirically establishes a lower bound for the overall 
impact of nation-level institutions; future research could focus on understanding which institutions are 
more likely to affect certain types of CSR actions and strategies more so than others, and the resulting 
effect on CSP.   
  Since both environmental and social performance scores are constructed by Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4 by examining only publicly available information for publicly-traded firms, our theoretical 
and empirical findings will likely be more relevant for publicly traded firms rather than privately-
owned ones. Such firms may respond to institutional incentives (if at all) in significantly different 
ways than public firms do, and therefore it is likely that our results do not apply directly to that 
context. To the extent that data exists about CSP of privately-held firms, future research could seek to 
understand whether and how such firms respond to institutional structures in terms of their CSP.  
Similar to all CSP measures and metrics used in past literature, it is possible that the scores 
that we obtained from Thomson Reuters ASSET4, although reflecting accurately and summarizing 
effectively all the available information about a focal corporation’s social performance, they might 
not fully reflect the actual social impact of the firms’ CSR activities.  In other words, to the extent that 
available public information does not fully reflect the real social impact of CSR activities, our 
measures will tend to be noisy and incomplete. Future research therefore, could focus on developing 
direct measures of the real social impact that CSR activities have on various stakeholder groups, 
rather than use measures based solely on public disclosures of various forms. 35 
 
Finally, we note that firms may be in a position to game their CSP scores so as to generate 
favorable organizational outcomes (e.g. legitimacy or reputation). Prior research has shown that CSR 
is inherently prone to decoupling (Weaver et al. 1996) where decoupling is defined as the low extent 
of implementation of a focal initiative (Westphal et al. 1994). For example, adoption of a code of 
ethics may or may not trigger substantial changes in the corporation’s day to day operations, 
depending on the degree of implementation; in other words, some corporations may only symbolically 
adopt the code to “tick the box” of the rating agency. We consider this to be unlikely but possible for 
our context. Company self-reported data is all but one of the many sources that are being used by 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4 to gather information. The list of sources would also include NGOs, stock 
exchange filings, and independent news sources. As much as the company could ‘game’ their own 
reporting, it is unlikely that it would be able to influence to the same degree all of these third-party 
sources. However, future research could explore the propensity of organizations to decouple their 
CSR activities under different institutional regimes and the subsequent CSP implications. 
Implications 
Given the growing attention that managers and top executives worldwide pay to the adoption 
and implementation of CSR activities and the resulting CSP, it is crucial that they understand the key 
factors affecting their organizations’ social performance, especially those factors outside the 
boundaries of their own firms and thus, those factors beyond their direct control. In this study, we 
identify and quantify such factors, both at the firm and industry level but more importantly, at the 
level of NBS that oversee the external environments in which corporations exist and operate.  
At the same time, our work has important policy implications by presenting evidence of the 
profound impact that institutions have in influencing the social performance of the corporations in the 
ecosystem that these institutions are meant to oversee. Therefore, our work is particularly relevant for 
emerging and less developed countries in which the political, the education and labor, and the 
financial systems, are currently being built and/or their roles are being redefined. Policy makers 
should design or redesign institutions by being fully aware of the power that such institutions have in 
determining the social and environmental performance of corporations and thus, in defining their net 
contribution towards the resolution of the world’s most acute problems.36 
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Table 1: Variable definitions, measures and data sources 
 
Category  Measure  Measurement  Source 
           
Political System 
Competition and regulation  Laws encourage competition in the country (Measured each year)  IMD World competitiveness report 
Anti-self dealing index  Laws limit self-dealing of insiders (Measured as of 2001)   La Porta et al. (2006) 
Absence of corruption  Inverse of average corruption score over the period 1996 through 2000   World Bank 
Left/centre ideology 
Chief executive and largest party in congress have left/centre political 
orientation (Measured as the percentage of years between 1928 and 1995 during 
which both the party of the chief executive and the largest party in congress had 
left or centre orientation) 
Botero et al. (2004) 
           
Education and Labour System 
Union density  Employees are densely organized in unions (Measured as of 1997)  Botero et al. (2004) 
Availability of skilled labour  Skilled labour is readily available in a country  (Measured each year)  IMD World competitiveness report 
           
Financial System 
Country Debt over Assets  The average debt over assets ratio for all firms within a country-year pair 
(Measured each year)  Worldscope 
SRI Index  Indicator variable for country-years where a socially responsible stock market 
index exists  (Measured each year)  World Federation of Exchanges 
           
Cultural System  Power Distance Index 
"The extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and 
institutions accept and expect that power is distributed unequally"  (Measured as 
of 1973) 
Hofstede (1997, 2001) 
   Individualism  "The degree to which individuals are integrated into groups"  (Measured as of 
1973)  Hofstede (1997, 2001) 
           
Country Controls 
Basic infrastructure  Quality of basic infrastructure in a country  (Measured each year)  IMD World competitiveness report 
Balance of trade  (Exports-Imports)/GDP  (Measured each year)  IMD World competitiveness report 
Trade  (Exports+Imports)/GDP  (Measured each year)  IMD World competitiveness report 
    Market Capitalizaion  Log of total market capitalization    IMD World competitiveness report 
Industry controls  Herfindal index  Log of sum of squared ratios of firm sales over industry sales (Measured each 
year)  Worldscope 
           
Firm Controls 
Return on Assets (ROA)  Industry-adjusted net income over total assets (Measured each year)  Worldscope 
Volatility  Daily stock return volatility over the fiscal year (Measured each year)  Worldscope 
Market to Book Ratio (MTB)  Market value of equity over book value of equity calculated at fiscal year end 
(Measured each year)  Worldscope 45 
 
R&D Expenses  Research and development expenses over sales (Measured each year)  Worldscope 
Firm size  Logarithm of total assets (Measured each year)  Worldscope 
Number of segments  Logarithm of number of four digit SIC codes the company operates in 
(Measured each year)  Worldscope 
Analyst coverage  Number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts for the firm (Measured each year)  IBES 
ADR  Company trades an American Depositary Receipt (Measured each year)  Worldscope 
Percentage of shares closely held  Percentage of shares held by investors owing more than 5% (Measured each 
year)  Worldscope 
Leverage  One minus the ratio of shareholder's equity over total assets (Measured each 
year)  Worldscope 46 
 
Table 2 – Panel A: Average and standard deviation of social and environmental scores and CSP index 
across years, by country (N = 12,764) 
 
Country  Firms  Obs  Environmental  Social  CSP Index 
         Mean  St.Dev.  Mean  St.Dev.  Mean  St.Dev. 
                          
Australia (AUS)  93  414  0.48  0.30  0.48  0.29  0.48  0.27 
Austria (AUT)  21  104  0.46  0.31  0.43  0.31  0.44  0.29 
Belgium (BEL)  26  142  0.50  0.32  0.46  0.31  0.48  0.30 
Brazil (BRA)  18  29  0.67  0.28  0.80  0.27  0.73  0.27 
Canada (CAN)  247  712  0.37  0.28  0.39  0.29  0.38  0.27 
Switzerland (CHE)  60  324  0.60  0.31  0.58  0.32  0.59  0.29 
Chile (CHL)  5  5  0.34  0.24  0.58  0.27  0.46  0.25 
China Mainland (CHN)  23  37  0.40  0.25  0.40  0.27  0.40  0.24 
Czech Republic (CZE)  2  2  0.73  0.20  0.76  0.07  0.74  0.06 
Germany (DEU)  79  391  0.63  0.31  0.63  0.28  0.63  0.27 
Denmark (DNK)  24  136  0.47  0.29  0.44  0.30  0.46  0.28 
Spain (ESP)  53  277  0.64  0.29  0.69  0.31  0.67  0.29 
Finland (FIN)  24  142  0.70  0.26  0.64  0.25  0.67  0.23 
France (FRA)  91  487  0.72  0.26  0.73  0.26  0.73  0.23 
United Kingdom (GBR)  341  1,703  0.57  0.28  0.62  0.26  0.59  0.25 
Greece (GRC)  25  131  0.46  0.29  0.48  0.32  0.47  0.29 
Hong Kong (HKG)  69  273  0.33  0.26  0.36  0.26  0.34  0.24 
Hungary (HUN)  1  1  0.89     0.91     0.90               
Indonesia (IDN)  4  4  0.24  0.06  0.63  0.22  0.44  0.12 
India (IND)  21  26  0.47  0.28  0.60  0.27  0.53  0.26 
Ireland (IRL)  17  86  0.40  0.25  0.39  0.23  0.40  0.22 
Israel (ISR)  2  8  0.20  0.08  0.19  0.10  0.19  0.06 
Italy (ITA)  53  262  0.47  0.35  0.60  0.33  0.53  0.32 
Jordan (JOR)  1  1  0.20     0.36     0.28               
Japan (JPN)  407  1,837  0.59  0.33  0.41  0.32  0.50  0.30 
Korea (KOR)  20  35  0.70  0.32  0.58  0.33  0.64  0.31 
Mexico (MEX)  13  21  0.52  0.37  0.51  0.40  0.51  0.38 
Malaysia (MYS)  9  9  0.37  0.22  0.51  0.14  0.44  0.15 
Netherlands (NLD)  38  197  0.64  0.30  0.74  0.25  0.69  0.25 
Norway (NOR)  24  136  0.52  0.31  0.55  0.32  0.53  0.29 
New Zealand (NZL)  10  46  0.43  0.24  0.43  0.21  0.43  0.19 
Philippines (PHL)  1  1  0.39     0.15     0.27               
Poland (POL)  4  4  0.34  0.34  0.42  0.18  0.38  0.17 
Portugal (PRT)  12  62  0.60  0.29  0.68  0.27  0.64  0.24 
Russia (RUS)  12  20  0.60  0.29  0.50  0.30  0.55  0.25 
Singapore (SGP)  42  178  0.31  0.24  0.31  0.23  0.31  0.21 
Sweden (SWE)  53  305  0.59  0.31  0.60  0.27  0.59  0.26 
Thailand (THA)  3  4  0.43  0.37  0.40  0.34  0.42  0.34 
Turkey (TUR)  6  6  0.18  0.08  0.42  0.14  0.30  0.10 
Taiwan (TWN)  11  17  0.55  0.24  0.39  0.33  0.47  0.25 
United States (USA)  809  4,202  0.37  0.29  0.43  0.29  0.40  0.26 
South Africa (ZAF)  13  13  0.61  0.24  0.76  0.21  0.68  0.22 
N is the number of observations. All scores range between zero and one. Hong Kong is not a separate 
country but part of the People’s Republic of China as a specially administered region (SAR). 47 
 
 
Table 2 – Panel B: Number of observations by sector over years 
Industry  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  Total 
Airlines  11  11  12  14  15  15  12  90 
Agriculture  0  0  1  1  1  2  1  6 
Automobiles  24  24  39  53  53  54  50  297 
Banks  80  85  135  166  162  173  168  969 
Alcohol Bever  9  9  15  18  18  18  15  102 
Building Mat  18  18  32  44  43  45  45  245 
Shipping Cont  15  16  26  30  30  29  29  175 
Boxes  4  4  8  8  8  9  7  48 
Business Serv  39  40  101  122  123  138  128  691 
Chemicals  37  37  58  71  70  75  67  415 
Electronic Equip  45  45  68  91  94  98  93  534 
Clothes  6  6  9  17  18  19  14  89 
Construction  23  23  51  61  61  66  65  350 
Coal  0  0  6  6  6  8  8  34 
Computer Hard  11  11  19  28  27  27  23  146 
Computer Soft  24  24  45  57  58  55  55  318 
Pharmaceuticals  37  38  60  69  70  71  61  406 
Electrical Equip  4  4  11  17  18  19  17  90 
Energy  38  38  90  104  107  132  152  661 
Fabricated Prod  1  1  4  4  4  5  4  23 
Finance  36  36  95  113  115  133  135  663 
Food Products  16  17  30  45  46  50  46  250 
Entertainment  7  7  15  24  24  25  25  127 
Gold  0  0  8  10  11  12  26  67 
Defence  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  7 
Healthcare  9  9  15  16  13  15  15  92 
Household  19  19  36  43  43  45  40  245 
Insurance  45  46  88  104  105  112  101  601 
Measuring Equip  7  7  16  18  18  18  18  102 
Machinery  28  28  64  77  77  78  73  425 
Restaurants Hotel  16  17  26  28  29  28  25  169 
Medical Equip  21  21  31  34  34  34  34  209 
Mining  5  5  27  30  30  44  51  192 
Paper  11  11  17  22  22  24  24  131 
Personal Serv  3  3  9  11  13  13  13  65 
Real Estate  23  23  56  68  72  79  81  402 
Retail  48  48  85  113  116  125  122  657 
Rubber Plastic   3  3  6  7  7  7  7  40 
Shipping  0  0  3  4  4  4  3  18 
Tobacco Prod  7  7  7  7  6  8  7  49 
Soda Candy  7  7  13  17  18  18  16  96 
Steel  15  15  35  47  46  50  53  261 
Telecom  46  47  71  86  89  99  106  544 
Recreational Pr  11  11  14  19  19  18  16  108 
Transportation  36  36  68  84  84  92  84  484 
Textiles  0  0  2  2  2  2  2  10 
Utilities  52  53  90  108  109  116  115  643 
Wholesale  32  32  55  69  70  83  77  418 
                          
Total  930  943  1,773  2,188  2,209  2,391  2,330  12,764 
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Table 3: Summary statistics 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
              
CSP Index  0.49  0.29  0.06  0.98 
Environmental Performance Score  0.49  0.32  0.09  0.97 
Social Performance Score  0.50  0.31  0.00  0.99 
              
Competition and Regulation  3.60  0.23  2.36  3.99 
Anti-self Dealing Index  0.61  0.21  0.16  1.00 
Absence of Corruption  1.74  0.45  -0.84  2.39 
Left Ideology  0.45  0.27  0.00  1.00 
              
Union Density  0.26  0.18  0.01  0.90 
Availability of Skilled Labour  3.62  0.42  0.69  4.04 
              
Country debt over assets  0.54  0.10  0.23  0.77 
SRI Index  0.85  0.36  0.00  1.00 
              
Power Distance Index  43.62  11.90  11.00  104.00 
Individualism  74.01  20.52  14.00  91.00 
              
Basic Infrastructure  3.75  0.39  0.69  4.01 
Balance of Trade  3.07  0.52  0.00  4.03 
Trade  2.51  0.80  0.00  4.04 
 Market Capitalization  1.22   0.57  0.16  3.63  
          Herfindal Index  -2.32  0.90  -4.59  0.00 
              
Return on Assets (ROA)  0.00  6.04  -59.27  34.87 
Volatility  27.61  8.98  11.69  63.08 
Market-to-Book Ratio (MTB)  3.02  3.18  -5.42  30.18 
R&D expenses  2.07  4.81  0.00  34.36 
Firm Size  8.94  1.64  1.52  15.14 
Number of Segments  0.38  0.46  0.00  1.39 
Analyst Coverage  13.13  8.80  1.00  53.00 
ADR  0.18  0.39  0.00  1.00 
Percentage of Shares Closely Held  25.66  22.46  0.00  100.00 
Leverage  61.67  21.71  9.04  108.44 
 
All variables are described in Table 1. CSP index is the average environmental and social 
score for a firm-year. 49 
 
Table 4: Average and standard deviation of nation-level institutional variables for each year 
 
 
Year  Competition and Regulation  Anti-self Dealing Index  Absence of Corruption  Left Ideology  Union Density 
   Mean  St.Dev.  Mean  St.Dev.  Mean  St.Dev.  Mean  St.Dev.  Mean  St.Dev. 
2002  3.718  0.253  0.575  0.200  1.785  0.391  0.535  0.237  0.267  0.207 
2003  3.620  0.212  0.575  0.201  1.782  0.395  0.532  0.238  0.268  0.207 
2004  3.619  0.210  0.617  0.209  1.779  0.395  0.456  0.265  0.262  0.174 
2005  3.620  0.220  0.609  0.207  1.751  0.401  0.424  0.277  0.265  0.172 
2006  3.641  0.214  0.610  0.207  1.750  0.404  0.423  0.277  0.264  0.170 
2007  3.567  0.216  0.607  0.206  1.728  0.475  0.435  0.278  0.263  0.166 
2008  3.514  0.237  0.615  0.202  1.690  0.566  0.444  0.283  0.261  0.166 
                                
Year  Availability of Skilled Labour  Country debt over assets  SRI Index  Power Distance Index  Individualism 
   Mean  St.Dev.  Mean  St.Dev.  Mean  St.Dev.  Mean  St.Dev.  Mean  St.Dev. 
2002  3.694  0.400  0.599  0.073  0.798  0.401  41.429  10.703  79.803  15.689 
2003  3.644  0.413  0.594  0.068  0.828  0.378  41.427  10.714  79.688  15.715 
2004  3.554  0.473  0.544  0.091  0.809  0.394  42.985  11.368  75.447  19.976 
2005  3.626  0.368  0.537  0.092  0.856  0.351  43.664  11.549  73.339  20.676 
2006  3.630  0.380  0.526  0.091  0.856  0.351  43.697  11.565  73.304  20.724 
2007  3.636  0.418  0.520  0.098  0.844  0.363  44.227  12.127  72.416  21.286 
2008  3.624  0.453  0.528  0.106  0.881  0.324  45.153  13.260  71.258  22.223 50 
 
 
 
Table 5: Correlation matrix – Panel A 
 
Variable    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
CSP Index  (1)  1                                        
Environmental Performance Score  (2)  0.93  1                                     
Social Performance Score  (3)  0.92  0.71  1                                  
Competition and Regulation  (4)  -0.23  -0.22  -0.20  1                               
Anti-self Dealing Index  (5)  -0.12  -0.15  -0.08  0.37  1                            
Absence of Corruption  (6)  -0.01  -0.04  0.03  0.51  0.32  1                         
Left Ideology  (7)  -0.15  -0.22  -0.05  0.37  0.04  0.41  1                      
Union Density  (8)  0.10  0.11  0.07  -0.13  -0.22  0.28  -0.02  1                   
Availability of Skilled Labour  (9)  -0.16  -0.12  -0.18  0.34  -0.36  -0.06  0.28  -0.20  1                
Country debt over assets  (10)  0.00  -0.01  0.02  -0.24  -0.54  -0.37  0.22  -0.18  0.44  1             
SRI Index  (11)  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.09  0.06  0.05  0.01  -0.44  0.11  0.05  1          
Power Distance Index  (12)  0.02  0.06  -0.02  -0.30  -0.13  -0.68  -0.43  -0.34  0.10  0.12  -0.18  1       
Individualism  (13)  -0.05  -0.13  0.04  0.28  0.33  0.50  0.60  -0.16  -0.08  0.03  0.50  -0.66  1    
Basic Infrastructure  (14)  -0.14  -0.12  -0.13  0.63  0.17  0.45  0.34  -0.27  0.46  -0.03  0.18  -0.18  0.26  1 
Balance of Trade  (15)  0.07  0.14  -0.01  -0.05  -0.42  0.07  -0.28  0.51  0.20  -0.18  -0.10  0.10  -0.46  -0.06 
Trade  (16)  0.16  0.14  0.15  -0.19  -0.07  0.26  -0.20  0.51  -0.29  -0.36  -0.37  -0.01  -0.33  -0.27 
Market Capitalization  (17)  -0.08  -0.13  -0.02  0.46  0.55  0.47  0.39  -0.28  0.04  -0.21  0.10  0.38  -0.13  0.36 
Herfindal Index  (18)  0.19  0.17  0.18  -0.21  -0.16  0.09  -0.15  0.36  -0.29  -0.15  -0.34  0.01  -0.20  -0.23 
Return on Assets (ROA)  (19)  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Volatility  (20)  -0.17  -0.16  -0.15  0.01  0.04  -0.01  0.02  0.05  0.00  0.05  -0.03  -0.02  -0.01  0.00 
Market-to-Book Ratio (MTB)  (21)  -0.05  -0.08  0.00  0.06  0.07  0.04  0.10  -0.05  -0.02  0.00  -0.01  -0.07  0.10  0.04 
R&D expenses  (22)  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.06  -0.05  0.01  0.08  -0.07  0.15  0.14  0.08  -0.04  0.07  0.10 
Firm Size  (23)  0.39  0.33  0.38  -0.10  -0.17  -0.19  0.00  -0.13  0.12  0.20  0.06  0.14  -0.04  -0.03 
Number of Segments  (24)  0.16  0.17  0.12  -0.05  -0.05  -0.09  -0.18  0.03  0.01  0.00  -0.09  0.14  -0.20  -0.04 
Analyst Coverage  (25)  0.32  0.25  0.35  -0.13  -0.17  -0.13  0.06  -0.10  0.08  0.30  -0.02  0.09  0.01  0.00 
ADR  (26)  0.31  0.28  0.30  -0.16  -0.06  -0.06  -0.25  0.15  -0.17  -0.09  -0.17  0.11  -0.23  -0.17 
Percentage of Shares Closely Held  (27)  -0.08  -0.06  -0.10  -0.20  -0.16  -0.23  -0.25  0.09  -0.06  -0.05  -0.28  0.32  -0.42  -0.18 
Leverage  (28)  0.14  0.10  0.16  -0.15  -0.07  -0.05  -0.04  0.01  -0.08  0.10  0.02  -0.01  0.04  -0.11 
 51 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Correlation matrix – Panel B 
 
Variable    (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20)  (21)  (22)  (23)  (24)  (25)  (26)  (27)  (28) 
Balance of Trade  (15)  1                                        
Trade  (16)  0.47  1                                     
Market Capitalization  (17)  -0.43  -0.09  1                                  
Herfindal Index  (18)  0.25  0.46  -0.19  1                               
Return on Assets (ROA)  (19)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1                            
Volatility  (20)  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.01  -0.11  1                         
Market-to-Book Ratio (MTB)  (21)  -0.14  -0.05  0.08  0.03  0.22  0.06  1                      
R&D expenses  (22)  -0.03  -0.12  0.05  0.00  -0.06  0.26  0.11  1                   
Firm Size  (23)  0.01  -0.09  -0.08  -0.05  -0.09  -0.26  -0.22  -0.14  1                
Number of Segments  (24)  0.11  0.05  -0.08  0.07  -0.02  -0.07  -0.05  -0.09  0.11  1             
Analyst Coverage  (25)  -0.07  -0.02  0.01  0.06  0.06  0.02  0.06  0.19  0.39  -0.01  1          
ADR  (26)  0.18  0.26  -0.11  0.20  -0.01  0.00  -0.05  0.02  0.25  0.10  0.26  1       
Percentage of Shares Closely Held  (27)  0.21  0.23  -0.23  0.23  0.01  0.03  0.02  -0.07  -0.09  0.03  -0.04  0.07  1    
Leverage  (28)  -0.04  0.02  -0.09  -0.01  -0.16  -0.10  0.00  -0.31  0.48  0.10  0.03  0.06  -0.06  1 52 
 
 
Table 6: Main regression analysis 
 
   DV: CSP Index  DV: CSP Index  DV: Environ. Score  DV: Social Score  DV: CSP Index 
   Full Sample  Std.Err.  Full Sample  Std.Err.  Full Sample  Std.Err.  Full Sample  Std.Err.  Domestic  Std.Err. 
   (0)    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)   
Political System                     
Competition and Regulation (H1)      -0.151***  -0.019  -0.177***  (0.022)  -0.125***  (0.022)  -0.181***  (0.026) 
Anti-self Dealing Index (H2)      -0.169***  -0.031  -0.181***  (0.034)  -0.156***  (0.033)  -0.112***  (0.039) 
Absence of Corruption (H3)      0.135***  -0.018  0.138***  (0.020)  0.133***  (0.019)  0.141***  (0.022) 
Left Ideology (H4)      -0.171***  -0.022  -0.242***  (0.024)  -0.100***  (0.024)  -0.142***  (0.027) 
                      
Education and Labor System                     
Union Density (H5)      0.191***  -0.038  0.233***  (0.042)  0.148***  (0.041)  0.143***  (0.055) 
Availability of Skilled Labour (H6)      -0.080***  -0.011  -0.073***  (0.013)  -0.086***  (0.012)  -0.074***  (0.015) 
                      
Financial System                     
Country debt over assets (H7)      -0.242***  -0.062  -0.317***  (0.068)  -0.167**  (0.068)  -0.297***  (0.077) 
SRI Index (H8)      -0.001  -0.014  0.012  (0.015)  -0.014  (0.016)  0.002  (0.020) 
                      
Cultural System                     
Individualism (H9)      0.001***  0.000  0.000  (0.000)  0.002***  (0.000)  0.002***  (0.001) 
Power Distance Index (H10)      0.002***  -0.001  0.002***  (0.001)  0.003***  (0.001)  0.002***  (0.001) 
                      
Country Controls                     
Basic Infrastructure      -0.004  -0.013  0.015  (0.014)  -0.023*  (0.014)  -0.022  (0.016) 
Balance of Trade      -0.070***  -0.014  -0.058***  (0.014)  -0.083***  (0.015)  -0.066***  (0.017) 
Trade      0.019***  -0.005  0.005  (0.006)  0.034***  (0.006)  0.024***  (0.008) 
Market Capitalization      0.006  -0.014  0.005  (0.015)  0.007  (0.014)  0.008  (0.018) 
                      
Industry Controls                     
Herfindal Index  0.071***  -0.005  0.014**  -0.006  0.006  (0.007)  0.021***  (0.007)  0.026***  (0.008) 
Industry fixed effects  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
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Firm Controls                     
Return on Assets (ROA)  0.001***  0.000  0.001***  0.000  0.001**  (0.000)  0.002***  (0.000)  0.001***  (0.000) 
Volatility  -0.003***  0.000  -0.003***  0.000  -0.003***  (0.000)  -0.003***  (0.000)  -0.002***  (0.000) 
Market-to-Book Ratio (MTB)  0.002**  -0.001  0.005***  -0.001  0.004***  (0.001)  0.005***  (0.001)  0.006***  (0.001) 
R&D expenses  0.004***  -0.001  0.005***  -0.001  0.005***  (0.001)  0.004***  (0.001)  0.004***  (0.001) 
Firm Size  0.072***  -0.004  0.092***  -0.003  0.094***  (0.004)  0.090***  (0.004)  0.090***  (0.004) 
Number of Segments  0.010  -0.009  0.012  -0.009  0.006  (0.010)  0.018*  (0.009)  0.007  (0.010) 
Analyst Coverage  0.004***  -0.001  0.004***  0.000  0.003***  (0.001)  0.005***  (0.001)  0.005***  (0.001) 
ADR  0.102***  -0.011  0.045***  -0.010  0.026**  (0.012)  0.064***  (0.011)  0.047***  (0.015) 
Percentage of Shares Closely Held  -0.001***  0.000  -0.001***  0.000  -0.001***  (0.000)  -0.001***  (0.000)  -0.000*  (0.000) 
Leverage  0.001**  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000  (0.000)  -0.000  (0.000)  -0.000  (0.000) 
                      
Constant  -0.069  -0.101  0.443***  -0.113  0.593***  (0.122)  0.293**  (0.122)  0.556***  (0.141) 
Year fixed effects  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
                      
Observations  12764    12764    12764    12764    7288   
R-squared  0.395    0.469    0.457    0.405    0.463   
 
***,**,*: significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level for a two-tailed test. 
All variables are described in Table 1. The first three columns include all observations. The fourth column includes only domestic firms. The 
estimates coefficients are derived from OLS estimation with clustered at the firm level and robust standard errors. 54 
 
Table 7: Regression results: Home vs. Host country institutions for multinational corporations 
 
   CSP Index 
Political System - Home 
 
  
Competition and Regulation  -0.140*  (0.075) 
Anti-self Dealing Index  -0.344***  (0.104) 
Absence of Corruption  0.215***  (0.065) 
Left Ideology  -0.280***  (0.076) 
  
 
  
Political System - Host 
 
  
Competition and Regulation  0.160*  (0.082) 
Anti-self Dealing Index  -0.196  (0.144) 
Absence of Corruption  -0.184**  (0.073) 
Left Ideology  -0.105  (0.087) 
        
Education and Labour System - Home 
 
  
Union Density  0.347***  (0.115) 
Availability of Skilled Labour  0.026  (0.037) 
  
 
  
Education and Labour System - Host 
 
  
Union Density  0.250  (0.216) 
Availability of Skilled Labour  0.041  (0.040) 
        
Financial System - Home 
 
  
Country debt over assets  -0.199  (0.218) 
SRI Index  -0.010  (0.050) 
  
 
  
Financial System - Host 
 
  
Country debt over assets  -0.415***  (0.140) 
SRI Index  0.019  (0.052) 
        
Cultural System - Home 
 
  
Power Distance Index  0.004*  (0.002) 
Individualism  0.001  (0.001) 
  
 
  
Cultural System - Host 
 
  
Individualism  0.005**  (0.002) 
Power Distance Index  -0.003  (0.002) 
        
Constant  0.640  (0.395) 
        
Industry, firm controls  Yes    
Country controls – Home and Host  Yes    
        
Observations  857    
R-squared  0.599    
 
All variables are described in Table 1. All firm, industry, and country level variables from 
Table 6 are included in the model but the estimated coefficients are not presented. The 
estimates coefficients are derived from OLS estimation with clustered at the firm level and 
robust  standard  errors.  The  sample  includes  200  unique  multinational  firms.55 
 
 
Figure 1: Average environmental, social and CSP Index over time, across countries 
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Appendix 1 
 
Description of ASSET4 pillars and categories 
 
Overview of ASSET4 Data 2002 - 2008 
Pillars  Categories 
Environmental Performance  Resource Reduction 
   Emission Reduction 
   Product Innovation 
     
Social Performance  Employment Quality 
   Health & Safety 
   Training & Development 
   Diversity 
   Human Rights 
   Community 
   Customer / Product Responsibility 
     
 
Description of ASSET4 Categories (from ASSET4 documents) 
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  Resource Reduction 
The resource reduction category measures a company‘s management commitment and effectiveness towards 
achieving an efficient use of natural resources in the production process. It reflects a company‘s capacity to 
reduce the use of materials, energy or water, and to find more eco-efficient solutions by improving supply 
chain management. 
Emission Reduction 
The emission reduction category measures a company‘s management commitment and effectiveness towards 
reducing environmental emission in the production and operational processes. It reflects a company‘s capacity 
to reduce air emissions (greenhouse gases, F-gases, ozone-depleting substances, NOx and SOx, etc.), waste, 
hazardous waste, water discharges, spills or its impacts on biodiversity and to partner with environmental 
organizations to reduce the environmental impact of the company in the local or broader community. 
Product Innovation 
The product innovation category measures a company‘s management commitment and effectiveness towards 
supporting  the  research  and  development  of  eco-efficient  products  or  services.  It  reflects  a  company‘s 
capacity to reduce the environmental costs and burdens for its customers, and thereby creating new market 
opportunities  through  new  environmental  technologies  and  processes  or  eco-designed,  dematerialized 
products with extended durability. 
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Employment Quality 
The  workforce  /  employment  quality  category  measures  a  company‘s  management  commitment  and 
effectiveness towards providing high-quality employment benefits and job conditions. It reflects a company‘s 
capacity to increase its workforce loyalty and productivity by distributing rewarding and fair employment 
benefits, and by focusing on long-term employment growth and stability by promoting from within, avoiding 
lay-offs and maintaining relations with trade unions. 
Health and Safety 
The workforce / health & safety category measures a company‘s management commitment and effectiveness 
towards providing a healthy and safe workplace. It reflects a company‘s capacity to increase its workforce 
loyalty and productivity by integrating into its day-to-day operations a concern for the physical and mental 
health, well being and stress level of all employees. 
Training and Development 
The workforce / training and development category measures a company‘s management commitment and 
effectiveness  towards  providing  training  and  development  (education)  for  its  workforce.  It  reflects  a 57 
 
company‘s capacity to increase its intellectual capital, workforce loyalty and productivity by developing the 
workforce‘s skills, competences, employability and careers in an entrepreneurial environment. 
Diversity and Opportunity 
The workforce / diversity and opportunity category measures a company‘s management commitment and 
effectiveness towards maintaining diversity and equal opportunities in its workforce. It reflects a company‘s 
capacity to increase its workforce loyalty and productivity by promoting an effective life-work balance, a 
family friendly environment and equal opportunities regardless of gender, age, ethnicity, religion or sexual 
orientation. 
Human Rights 
The  society  /  human  rights  category  measures  a  company‘s  management  commitment  and  effectiveness 
towards respecting the fundamental human rights conventions. It reflects a company‘s capacity to maintain its 
license to operate by guaranteeing the freedom of association and excluding child, forced or compulsory 
labor. 
Community 
The society / community category measures a company‘s management commitment and effectiveness towards 
maintaining the company‘s reputation within the general community (local, national and global). It reflects a 
company‘s capacity to maintain its license to operate by being a good citizen (donations of cash, goods or 
staff  time, etc.), protecting public  health (avoidance of industrial accidents, etc.) and  respecting business 
ethics (avoiding bribery and corruption, etc.). 
Customer / Product Responsibility 
The  customer  /  product  responsibility  category  measures  a  company‘s  management  commitment  and 
effectiveness towards creating value-added products and services upholding the customer‘s security. It reflects 
a company‘s capacity to maintain its license to operate by producing quality goods and services integrating 
the  customer‘s  health  and  safety,  and  preserving  its  integrity  and  privacy  also  through  accurate  product 
information and labeling. 
 